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SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS-CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO STATE CAPITAL
COLLATERAL APPEAL: THE
DUE PROCESS OF
EXECUTING A CONVICT WITHOUT
ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION
Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
I INTRODUCTION
In Murray v. Giarratano,' a plurality of the United States
Supreme Court refused to establish a constitutional right of state
appointed counsel for indigent death row inmates seeking state
postconviction appeals. The plurality argued that equal protection
and due process rights to state appointed attorneys, which the Con-
stitution guarantees to prisoners for mandatory appeals, satisfies the
accuracy of the capital process. Denying that tension exists in the
prisoner rights line of cases, the plurality embraced the categorical
approach of earlier assistance of counsel cases to conclude that the
Constitution does not mandate state appointed attorneys for state
postconviction appeals.
Basing its argument on the fourteenth amendment, the dissent
maintained that capital cases' special procedural treatments at trial
and direct appeal fail to meet the accuracy necessary in a death pen-
alty case. The dissent also highlighted the important issues unique
to collateral appeals and the death row inmate's hardship in raising
these matters while awaiting his or her execution. The dissent dis-
tinguished the right to assistance of counsel cases from the issue
under consideration because those cases had not dealt with the
death sentence.
This Note argues that the plurality arbitrarily limited a line of
prisoner rights precedent that leads naturally to a constitutional
right to state appointed counsel in death penalty postconviction ap-
peals. In light of the realistic inability of death row inmates to pur-
l 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
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sue postconviction relief, the plurality should have extended the
right to state appointed counsel to include state postconviction ap-
peals. Also, after sampling policy reasons for the right to counsel in
postconviction appeals, this Note illustrates through a simple proce-
dural due process analysis the need for fourteenth amendment,
rather than legislative, protection of this important safeguard in our
capital adjudication process.
II. BACKGROUND
Murray is the latest indigent prisoner rights decision involving
the due process and equal protection clauses2 of the fourteenth and
sixth amendments.3 These precedents break into sometimes con-
verging, but analytically distinct, right-to-counsel and meaningful
access categories. 4 Murray applies these doctrines to state capital
collateral appeals. 5
A. INDIGENTS' RIGHTS TO STATE APPOINTED COUNSEL
The Court in Powell v. Alabama6 held that indigent prisoners ac-
cused of state capital offenses had the right to court appointed
counsel at trial. In that case, the Court held that the right to the
assistance of counsel was applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment because it was part of the "fundamental charac-
ter" of due process. 7 Alabama might not refuse to those defendants
2 'Due process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing
with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be
treated. 'Equal protection,' on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment by
a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably
indistinguishable.
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U:S. 600, 609 (1974).
3 The sixth amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Council for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The fourteenth amendment reads in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
4 The Court suggested this distinction in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551
(1987) (in rejecting a right to counsel on collateral appeal, the Court split its analysis
into right to counsel and meaningful access divisions).
5 Murray, 109 S. Ct. at 2765.
6 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
7 Id. at 68.
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the opportunity to hire counsel or receive state-appointed lawyers.8
The Court's decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright9 and Douglas v.
California 10 extended the right to counsel to include criminal cases
and mandatory appeals, respectively. I In Douglas, the Court relied
on the due process clause to invalidate a California rule requiring an
ex-parte judicial hearing before appointing counsel to an indigent
defendant's appeal of right.12 Although the state could have consid-
ered some economic differences among litigants,' 3 it might not have
singled out the poor for ex-parte determinations of guilt before the
appeal. 14 This procedure would have forced indigents to undergo a
"meaningless ritual" without a lawyer, whereas a wealthier defend-
ant could have enjoyed the privilege of a significant appeal unbur-
dened by the ex-parte determination.' 5
The Court also carved out limitations to this expanding right.
An indigent prisoner does not have a constitutional right to counsel
8 Id. at 71.
9 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
10 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
11 These decisions followed earlier cases expanding a defendant's right to assistance
of counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (criminal defendants in federal court
have an automatic right to state appointed counsel). But see Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942) (the sixth and fourteenth amendments do not require state appointed attorneys
for all state criminal trials in all circumstances), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
12 Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356.
13 The Court stated, "But it is appropriate to observe that a State can, consistently
with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for differences so long as the result does not
amount to a denial of due process or an invidious discrimination." Id. (citing William-
son v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18
(1956)).
14 The Court used far more stirring language in Gideon when it stated, "[n]ot only
these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our ad-
versary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Gideon, 372
U.S. at 344.
15 Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358. The Court stated, "For there can be no equal justice
where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has.' "
Id. at 355 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
The Court later extended the right to counsel line of cases to acknowledge the
state's constitutional duty to provide counsel in misdemeanor cases where imprison-
ment could result, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), and to include a right to
effective counsel. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (the constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel extends to the first appeal of right); Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (the sixth amendment right to counsel includes a right to
effective assistance of counsel); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (on appeal of
right, appointed counsel cannot withdraw from a case he deems meritless without first
following certain constitutionally required procedures). Though collateral appeals often
claim ineffective assistance of counsel in earlier proceedings, these issues remain outside




for discretionary appeals to state supreme courts or to the United
States Supremd Court. 16 Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. Finley,' 7 the
Court refused to acknowledge a constitutional right to state ap-
pointed counsel in state postconviction proceedings.' In these
cases, the Court distinguished trials, in which the state seeks to strip
the presumption of innocence from the defendant, from appeals, in
which the accused initiates the adjudication to overturn a prior de-
termination of guilt. 19 Because in a discretionary appeal the state
does not force the defendant into court to prove his guilt, its refusal
to appoint counsel to him does not violate due process.20
The Court in Ross further noted that the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment 2' does not mandate complete equality
among litigants. 22 Moreover, state discretionary reviews are not in-
tended to address the guilt of the accused.23 Rather, such reviews
usually center on constitutional questions or interesting legal is-
sues.2 4 The indigent prisoner's pro se petitions and records of ear-
lier materials suffice for this type of review.2 5  Finally, if
discretionary appeals garner no constitutional right to counsel, then
neither do collateral appeals.2
6
Thus, prior to Murray, both state and federal courts had right to
assistance obligations where imprisonment could result.
2 7
Although the right included an appeal of right, it did not encompass
discretionary or non-death penalty collateral appeals.
16 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
17 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
18 Id. In this case, appointed counsel for an indigent prisoner decided his client had
no basis for a habeas corpus petition. Rather than meeting the constitutionally required
process for withdrawing from a wholly frivolous appeal, counsel simply notified the
Court of his intention to drop the case. The Court held that the attorney had no consti-
tutional obligation to follow the procedure for withdrawing from an appeal of right.
Because a prisoner had no right to appointed counsel for discretionary appeals, he or
she also had no right on collateral attack, and an attorney need not follow a constitution-
ally mandated procedure before withdrawing. Id. at 557.
19 Ross, 417 U.S. at 610.
20 Id. at 611.
21 See supra note 3 for the text of the fourteenth amendment.
22 Ross, 417 U.S. at 611 ("[u]nfairness results only if indigents are singled out by the
State and denied meaningful access to the appellate system because of their poverty"
(citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)).
23 Id. at 615.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
27 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (the right to assistance of counsel does
not extend to a case in which imprisonment was authorized but not imposed).
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B. INDIGENT DEFENDANTS' MEANINGFUL ACCESS RIGHTS
A parallel line of cases beginning with Exparte Hull,28 assures to
an indigent prisoner the right to communicate with a court. Ac-
knowledging both due process and equal protection arguments, the
Court later extended this right to include documents necessary in
filing direct appeals and inmate legal assistance. 29 These cases com-
bined with the assistance of counsel precedents to define an indi-
gent prisoner's ability to access and use the courts.
In Bounds v. Smith,30 the Court harnessed much of the meaning-
ful access and right to counsel precedent to obligate states to estab-
lish either law libraries or assistance of legally trained individuals for
inmates drafting legal papers. The Court rhetorically raised and de-
feated the notion that precedent had prohibited restraints to court
access, but had not embraced the expenditure of state funds for
such purposes. 3 1 The Court rebuffed, stating that "[t]he inquiry is
rather whether law libraries or other forms of legal assistance are
needed to give prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity to pres-
ent claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the
courts." 32 Although the Court conceded that a prisoner needs only
to delineate the facts behind his complaint in a pro se civil rights or
habeas petition, 33 he requires some legal knowledge to recognize a
valid claim. 34 Unlike discretionary appeals which were tied to the
record, habeas corpus petitions often raised important new issues.35
In sum, the meaningful access doctrine before Murray forbade
the states from hindering an indigent convict's communication with
28 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) (a Michigan prison could not submit a prisoner's com-
munications or legal documents to multiple prison reviews before sending them to a
court).
29 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison could not hinder inmates from
helping fellow convicts prepare civil rights petitions); Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp.
105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd sub nom, Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (meaningful
access imposed an affirmative duty on the states to provide adequate law libraries to
prisoners); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (prison could not prohibit prisoners
from helping other inmates prepare habeas corpus petitions); Gardner v. California, 393
U.S. 367 (1969) (indigent had a right to a free transcript for habeas corpus petitions just
as for appeals of right); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (indigent prisoner
permitted free transcript on appeal of right where taking the appeal did not require a
transcript); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (state of Illinois prohibited from mak-
ing a defendant's direct appeal contingent upon his providing a bill of exceptions or
report of proceedings).
30 430 U.S. 817 (1977).







the courts. The doctrine also imposed an affirmative duty to create
meaningful access to the courts through state provided legal docu-
ments and research materials or assistance. While suggesting that
state-supplied counsel would serve the meaningful access require-
ment, the Court declined to require states to supply personal attor-
neys to indigent prisoners.
3 6
III. FACTS
In 1986, Joe Giarratano, a Virginia death r6w prisoner,37 filed a
pro se civil rights complaint3 8 for declaratory and injunctive relief
against the state of Virginia in the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia.39 He claimed that the state of Virginia
had a constitutional obligation under article I, the sixth amendment,
the eighth amendment, and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to provide counsel for death row inmates pursuing state
postconviction relief.
40
Because the Constitution requires states to provide to prisoners
meaningful access to the courts through law libraries or other legal
assistance,4' the district court interpreted the Constitution also to
36 Id. at 832.
37 Giarratano was sentenced to death in 1979 for rape and murder. Giarratano v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 266 S.E.2d 94 (1980).
38 Giarratano based his complaint on 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be con-
sidered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
The other principle type of postconviction proceeding is a writ of habeas corpus.
Federal habeas corpus review has been codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A successful mo-
tion under this statute requires that the individual be imprisoned against the Constitu-
tion, laws or treaties of the U.S., and that she first exhaust state remedies by raising the
question at issue in all possible state procedures. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (d) (1982).
39 Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1986).
40 Id. When other death row inmates intervened, the district court certified the
group as a class. The formal description of the class was as follows:
[A]II persons, now and in the future, sentenced to death in Virginia, whose
sentences have been or are subsequently affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court
and who either (1) cannot afford to retain and do not have attorneys to represent
them in connection with their post-conviction proceedings, or (2) could not afford
to retain and did not have attorneys to represent them in connection with a particu-
lar post-conviction proceeding.
Id. at 512.
41 This right was first enunciated in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). See supra
note 30 and accompanying text.
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require appointed counsel for death row postconviction actions.42
The district court highlighted the unique position of Virginia death
row inmates: they faced a limited time in which to prepare petitions,
confronted complex legal procedures, and suffered the strain of
preparing themselves and their families for the imminent execu-
tion. 43 These unique circumstances compelled the district court to
find law library access insufficient to satisfy meaningful access re-
quirements. 44 Likewise, both institutional lawyers serving multiple
prisoners on a limited basis and personal attorneys appointed after
a prisoner filed a nonfrivolous petition fall short of satisfying the
constitutional mandate. 45 Too few institutional attorneys serve too
many inmates in too limited a fashion. 46 Furthermore, attorneys
come into the litigation too late to do a major portion of the work
when the court appoints them after the prisoner files a nonfrivolous
motion.47 Finally, the district court argued that additional appoint-
ment rights would not impose substantial financial burdens because
the state already had appointed counsel to nonfrivolous claims.
48
The district court limited its holding to state habeas corpus pe-
titions because the underlying right to state appointed counsel ex-
cludes federal discretionary appeals.49 This limitation followed the
tenet that states should not fund counsel for an individual seeking
relief under a federal statute.50 The district court added that ex-
haustion requirements would supply federal courts with the advan-
tage of earlier materials on all issues possibly raised. 5'
The Commonwealth appealed the district court's requirement
42 Giarralano, 668 F. Supp. at 516.
43 Id. at 513.
44 Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511, 513 (E.D. Va. 1986).
45 Id. at 514.
46 The district court stated:
Currently there are seven institutional attorneys attempting to meet the needs of
over 2,000 prisoners. No pretense is made by the defendants in this case that these
few attorneys could handle the needs of death row prisoners in addition to provid-
ing assistance to other inmates.... Moreover, they are not hired to work full time;
they split time between their private practice and their institutional work. ...
... The scope of assistance these attorneys provide is simply too limited. The
evidence indicated that they do not perform factual inquiries of the kind necessi-
tated by death penalty issues. They act only as legal advisors or, to borrow the
phrase of one such attorney, as "talking law books."
Id.
47 Id.
48 The district court also noted that the burden would be slight because of the small
number of prisoners placed on death row each year. Id.
49 Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511, 516 (E.D. Va. 1986); see Ross v. Moffit,
417 U.S. 600 (1974); see supra note 16 and accompanying text.




of state appointed attorneys for state capital postconviction ap-
peal.52 The class of prisoners cross-appealed the district court's re-
fusal to include a right to assistance of counsel in federal appeals.
53
Finding the district court's factual findings clearly erroneous, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. 54 The court
deemed Finley 55-decidedafter the district court's opinion in Giar-
ratano-controlling precedent.56 It dismissed Bounds as not entailing
a right to counsel.57 Finally, the court limited consideration of any
"significant constitutional difference" of death penalty cases to the
trial phase.58
After en banc reconsideration, the circuit court affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision. 59 The circuit court determined that the lower
• court's findings were not clearly erroneous. 60 Finley had neither in-
volved meaningful access, addressed Bounds,6 1 nor discussed the
death penalty. 62 Finally, the court acknowledged that society's spe-
cial interest in properly imposing death sentences required consid-
eration of the punishment's "significant constitutional difference."
63
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to recon-
cile the circuit court's holding with Finley, and thereby determine
whether or not a constitutional right to counsel exists in a postcon-
viction proceeding.64
52 Giarratano v. Murray, 836 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1988).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1422.
55 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). See supra note 17 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Finley.
56 Giarratano, 836 F.2d at 1423-25.
57 Id. at 1424. The district court stated:
In Bounds the issue was access to "sources of legal knowledge" to prepare meaning-
ful papers ... and the Court explicitly stated that, for inmates seeking to file post-
conviction papers, meaningful access to the courts can be satisfied by either provid-
ing adequate law libraries or "adequate assistance from persons trained in the law."
Id. (citations omitted).
58 Id. at 1425.
59 Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988).
60 Id. at 1121. The circuit court stated:
The district court made findings of fact based upon the record which indicated that
Virginia was not in compliance with constitutional rights of access to the courts.
Under Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 ... (1985), we cannot say
these findings of fact are clearly erroneous.
Id. (citation omitted).
61 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). See supra note 30 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Bounds.
62 Giarratano, 847 F.2d at 1122.
63 Id.




IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE PLURALITY
Writing for the plurality, ChiefJustice Rehnquist 65 held that the
Constitution requires state appointed counsel only for trials and ap-
peals of right, not for voluntary postconviction proceedings. 66 He
first delineated the history of an indigent defendant's right to coun-
sel so as to reveal an expanding right to assistance limited only.by
Ross v. Moffitt and Finley.67 Addressing the relevance of Finley to cap-
ital postconviction rights, the Chief Justice conceded the existence
of special capital constitutional restraints. 68 These standards, how-
ever, have been limited to the trial level.6 9 Furthermore, in state
criminal procedures, the Constitution does not require collateral ap-
peals which serve a "different and more limited purpose than either
the trial or appeal." 70 Instead, the eighth amendment's heightened
procedural standards for capital trials assures the proper application
65 Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia joined Justice Rehnquist's opinion. Murray
v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
66 Id.
67 The Chief Justice cited Finley, 481 U.S. at 551 (the fourteenth amendment does
not mandate state appointed counsel in postconviction proceedings); Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600 (1974) (no constitutional right to counsel for discretionary appeals to state
supreme courts or to the United States Supreme Court); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (extends the right to assistance of counsel to include state felony cases);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to assistance of counsel embraces
mandatory appeals); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (the Constitution requires the
state of Illinois to provide an indigent defendant with the report of proceeding or bill of
exceptions necessary for his direct appeal).
68 Murray, 109 S. Ct. at 2769 (citing Beck v. Alabama 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (because of
the "significant constitutional difference between death penalty and lesser punish-
ments," Alabama could not impose a death sentence when the jury had not been in-
structed on lesser included offenses); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (the
state court had to consider evidence of troubled family background and emotional dis-
turbance before sentencing a 16 year old to death); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)
(noting the "qualitative difference" between death sentences and other penalties, the
Court required state judges to consider any proffered mitigating factors before imposing
capital punishment)).
69 Murray, 109 S. Ct. at 2769 (citing Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) (apply-
ing the "harmless error doctrine" to the admission of psychiatric testimony in capital
sentencing hearings); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (the eighth amendment
prohibits states from executing an individual who has become insane after his convic-
tion); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (procedural default precludes the raising of
defenses or errors not raised on direct appeal); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984)
(because California trial procedure provided adequate protection, the Court refused to
require proportionality review in appellate proceedings); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880 (1983) (the Florida Court of Appeals did not err when it decided the merits of an
appeal together with an application for a stay of execution, even though it did not for-
mally affirm the lower court's holding); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)).
70 Murray, 109 S. Ct. at 2770.
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of the death penalty. 71 The rule in Finley, therefore, applies uni-
formly in capital and non-capital cases. 72
The plurality denied that the state would have saved funds by
providing attorneys to prisoners before they filed habeas corpus
motions. 7 Although attorneys might have weeded out frivolous pe-
titions, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected this argument as an im-
proper basis for constitutional adjudication.7 4 He also suggested
that the state might invest in a better direct appellate process to re-
duce the number of genuine issues arising for postconviction
proceedings. 75
Denying any tension between Bounds and Finley, Chief Justice
Rehnquist eschewed as "strange jurisprudence" the lower court's
use of the 1977 Bounds holding to limit the 1987 Finley decision.76
He deemed a limitation based on factual findings "even stranger ju-
risprudence" because the districts might then create varying consti-
tutional rights to counsel. 77 These jurisdictional variations would
become firmly entrenched because appellate courts could review
them only on the "clearly erroneous" standard applicable to factual
findings. 78 Finally, he argued that a factual-based constitutional
standard would contravene the categorical approach to right-to-
counsel cases used since Gideon.79
Therefore, the Chief Justice extended the Finley Court's denial
of a constitutional right to counsel in discretionary appellate pro-
ceedings to capital cases and forms of collateral review other than
discretionary appeals. 80 He thereby limited the Bounds meaningful











79 Id. (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Griffin v. Illinois, 851 U.S. 12
(1956); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551
(1987); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963)).
80 Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2772 (1989).
81 Id.
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B. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS
1. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Concurring, Justice O'Connor agreed that no constitutional or
precedential authority requires state appointed counsel in postcon-
viction proceedings. 82 Although acknowledging the difficulties fac-
ing death row inmates seeking collateral review, she championed
the discretion given to the states by Bounds.83 The state legislatures
would have to formulate any further requirements.
8 4
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Concurring, Justice Kennedy85 agreed that the states could sup-
ply meaningful access to the courts in many ways.8 6 Because impos-
ing one method of achieving this access might preclude better
options, he claimed that the choice belongs to the state legislatures,
which are better able than the Court to study the policy ramifica-
tions of the various choices. 87 Furthermore, Virginia did not violate
the Court's meaningful access requirements.8 8 Each Virginia in-
mate had obtained counsel before pursuing postconviction
proceedings. 89
Justice Kennedy disagreed with the plurality's diminution of the
role of postconviction proceedings in the criminal justice process. 90
He admitted that the complexity of such proceedings greatly in-
creases the difficulty of success without counsel. 9' Thus, he re-
stricted his agreement with the plurality to the facts of this case.
9 2
82 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Finley, 481 U.S. at 551).
83 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
84 Murray, 109 S. Ct. at 2772 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor elabo-
rated that "[b]eyond the requirements of Bounds, the matter is one of legislative choice
based on difficult policy considerations and the allocation of scarce legal resources. Our
decision today rightly leaves these issues to resolution by Congress and the state legisla-
tures." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
85 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor joined Justice Kennedy, concur-
ring in judgment.
86 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 2773 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
88 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
89 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
90 Id. at 2772 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated, "The complexity of our ju-
risprudence in this area, moreover, makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be able
to file successful petitions for collateral relief without the assistance of persons learned
in the law." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). "On the facts and record of this case, I concur in the
judgement of the court." Id. at 2773.
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C. THE DISSENT
Dissenting, Justice Stevens93 argued that the fourteenth amend-
ment requires state appointed attorneys for the respondents. 94
Viewing right-to-counsel and meaningful access cases as a single
line of authority,9 5 he highlighted three factors unique to these
death row inmates which triggers their right to appointed counsel.
First, the dissent emphasized capital cases' special procedural treat-
ment.96 Maintaining that the trial and appeal of right does not as-
sure accuracy in such an important and irreversible matter, he called
for the continuation of these heightened procedural standards
through the collateral appeal. 97 Justice Stevens dismissed Finley as
irrelevant because it did not involve the death penalty.9 8
Second, the significant role of collateral appeals in Virginia's
capital trials further distinguishes Finley, a discretionary appeal,
from a non-capital conviction. Postconviction proceedings provide
the first opportunity to raise claims procedurally barred on direct
review because trial counsel neglects to raise them.99 Moreover,
raising a claim, which a state court procedurally bars during collat-
eral appeal, requires that the defendant show "cause for the default
and resultant prejudice, or that failure to review [would] cause fun-
93 Id. (StevensJ, dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and BlackmunjoinedJus-
tice Stevens in his dissent.
94 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 2774 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
Far from creating a discrete constitutional right, Bounds constitutes one part of a
jurisprudence that encompasses "right-to-counsel" as well as "access-to-courts"
cases. Although each case is shaped by its facts, all share a concern, based upon the
Fourteenth Amendment, that accused and convicted persons be permitted to seek
legal remedies without arbitrary governmental interference.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (striking down an
Indiana law making it possible for a wealthy individual to appeal a denial of a writ of
corum noblis, while an indigent had to first receive the aid of a public defender); Smith v.
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (Indiana cannot make a habeas corpus petition contingent
on a four dollar filing fee); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1959)).
96 Murray, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2777 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 2778 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens commented:
There is, however, significant evidence that in capital cases what is ordinarily con-
sidered direct review does not sufficiently safeguard against miscarriages ofjustice
to warrant this presumption of finality. Federal habeas courts granted relief in only
0.25% to 7%o of non-capital cases in recent years; in striking contrast, the success
rate in capital cases ranged from 60% to 70%. Such a high incidence of uncor-
rected error demonstrates that the meaningful appellate review" necessary in a capi-
tal case extends beyond the direct appellate process.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 2776 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 2778 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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damental miscarriage of justice."' 0 0 These factors made state col-
lateral appeal crucial to the capital conviction process.' 0 '
Third, Justice Stevens reiterated the circuit court's findings that
death row inmates had been largely unable to mount successful col-
lateral attacks. 10 2 Echoing the meaningful access cases, he con-
cluded that Virginia's refusal to appoint counsel until after a
nonfrivolous petition had been filed failed to "assure its indigent
death row inmates an adequate opportunity to present their claims
fairly."' 03 Finally, Justice Stevens claimed that the state has no
countervailing interest in denying counsel to the respondents. 0 4
V. ANALYSIS
Because precedent fails to compel the denial of appointed
counsel for death row inmates and because death row prisoners ex-
perience unique conditions, the Court should have extended the
natural trend of meaningful access cases to include appointed coun-
sel in state death penalty collateral appeals. 0 5 Furthermore, the
lack of state interest to withhold counsel makes inconceivable the
plurality's denial of state appointed attorneys beyond a trial of right.
A. PRECEDENT FAILS TO COMPEL THE PLURALITY'S DENIAL OF THE
RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN CAPITAL COLLATERAL
PROCEEDINGS
The plurality failed to recognize manifest tensions between the
Bounds meaningful access and Finley right to counsel doctrines. 10 6
The latter, 10 7 relying largely on Ross, denies constitutional rights to
100 Id. at 2779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 2780 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 2781 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976) (due process does not require an evidentiary hearing in a disability benefit
pretermination case)). Justice Stevens mentioned that Virginia already appointed coun-
sel after the submission of nonfrivolous petitions, and that there were only 32 inmates
on death row. Thus, the state would not incur large additional costs in supplying attor-
neys. Furthermore, because state appointed counsel would reduce the burden of frivo-
lous or multiple petitions, Virginia would receive a net benefit from appointing
attorneys before the filing of any pro se motion. Id. at 2781. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105 See Mello, Is There a Federal Constitutional Right to Counsel in Capital Post-Conviction
Proceedings?, 79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1065 (1989).
106 See Mlurray, 109 S. Ct. at 2771. The appellate court, however, realized the differ-
ences between Finley and Bounds. Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118, 1122 (4th. Cir.
1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989). Finley did not deal with meaningful access, it did
not address the Bounds meaningful access doctrine, and it did not involve the death pen-
alty. Id.
107 See supra note 17 and accompanying text for an account of Finley.
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assistance of counsel after mandatory appeals of right are com-
pleted. 10 8 The equal protection and due process doctrines dis-
cussed in Powell and Douglas extend to only one mandatory
appeal. t0 9 In the meaningful access cases such as Bounds, however,
the accused enjoys a "reasonably adequate opportunity to present
claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the
courts."' 1 0 The states must protect this right even if it means sup-
plying law libraries or other types of legal assistance."'I Unlike the
right to assistance of counsel, the meaningful access doctrine ex-
tends to postconviction procedures."
12
Because the plaintiffs in Murray were seeking collateral relief af-
ter mandatory appeals, the Finley line seems determinative of their
rights to assistance of counsel. Special characteristics of death row
inmates, however, make law libraries or institutional attorneys insuf-
ficient to meet the Bounds requirement of meaningful access. Thus,
the Finley and Bounds lines of precedent plausibly reach opposite re-
sults in cases such as Murray.
13
The Court's list of special procedures applicable to capital trials
but not to appeals 14 also fails to support a denial of counsel. Os-
tensibly, this list of examples rejects a death row petitioner's special
rights based solely on the imposition of the death penalty. The
lower court's extension of the Bounds meaningful access doctrine re-
quired that death row inmates receive, special treatment. Otherwise,
the lower court would have had to argue for the much broader
proposition that all capital convicts, or all convicts, have a constitu-
tional right to counsel on collateral appeal.
Although somewhat meritorious, the Court's argument that
special safeguards protect only the trial phase of a capital proceed-
ing fails to justify denying the assistance of counsel to the Murray
prisoners."15 The Court has stated that death penalty trials are
108 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
109 See supra notes 6 and 12 and accompanying text for discussions of Powell and
Douglas.
11O Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977).
1'I Id.
112 Id.
113 Therefore, one can conclude that the Court chose to cut the right to counsel line
short, possibly because of cost considerations, while the meaningful access line contin-
ued its natural development.
114 See supra note 69 and accompanying text for an enumeration of these procedures.
115 Likewise, the Court's argument that the categorical approach present since Belts
prohibits an exception for attorney appointment on capital collateral appeals does not
withstand scrutiny. The Court's meaningful access line of cases has never adhered to
this categorical doctrine. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817. The Court in Bounds stated, "We
hold, therefore, that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires
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unique only in some respects."t 6 Therefore, the Court simultane-
ously could have remained true to precedent, required state ap-
pointed attorneys for indigent death row inmates, and avoided any
"floodgates" objections. Given the arguably fundamental nature of
representation by counsel in assuring other legal rights, the Court's
failure to require state appointed counsel is indefensible."1
7
The plurality's categorization of collateral appeal as civil or sec-
ondary' "8 fails to limit the meaningful access doctrine to appeals of
right. Under the Court's theory, due process does not involve coun-
sel on discretionary appeal because the convicted individual, rather
than the state, initiates the proceeding. 1 9 However, the state must
.provide an attorney on the first appeal of right, which the prisoner
prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal
papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law." Id. at 828. The Court then eschewed any categorical man-
date. "It should be noted that while adequate law libraries are one constitutionally ac-
ceptable method to assure meaningful access to the courts, our decision here, as in
Gilmore, does not foreclose alternative means to achieve that goal." Id. at 830. Instead,
the Court reiterated its contention that meaningful access "to the courts is the touch-
stone." Id. at 823. IndeedJustices Kennedy and O'Connor disagreed with the plurality
because they viewed a right to counsel as too categorical under the Bounds holding. See
supra note 82 and accompanying text for Justice O'Connor's disagreement.
116 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) ("Direct appeal is the primary
avenue for review .... The role of federal habeas proceedings, while important in assur-
ing that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and limited."); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (procedural default situations in which an accused may waive
objections by not raising them at the appropriate time).
But see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (refusing to use a narrower eighth
amendment standard when determining whether a convicted individual was competent
to be executed):
Although the condemned prisoner does not enjoy the same presumptions accorded
a defendant who has yet to be convicted or sentenced, he has not lost the protection
of the Constitution altogether; if the Constitution renders the fact or timing of his
execution contingent upon establishment of a further fact, then that fact must be
determined with the high regard for truth that befits a decision affecting the life or
death of a human being. Thus, the ascertainment of a prisoner's sanity as a predi-
cate to lawful execution calls for no less stringent standards than those demanded in
any other aspect of a capital proceeding.
Id. at 411.
117 The initial circuit court opinion pointed out the inconsistency inherent in a class of
death row inmates making the argument that they had no access to the courts. Giar-
ratano v. Murray, 836 F.2d 1421, 1423 (4th Cir. 1988). The circuit court dissent, how-
ever, pointed out Giarratano's extraordinary abilities and that this was a less
complicated civil rights action, not a habeas corpus petition. Id. at 1430 (Hall, J.,
dissenting).
118 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) ("The role of federal habeas
proceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is sec-
ondary and limited."); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 (1963) (habeas corpus is civil in
nature).
119 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
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also initiates. 120 This internally inconsistent argument fails as a rea-
sonable justification for limiting state appointed counsel to appeals
of right. 121
B. REALISTIC CONDITIONS PRISONERS FACE CALL FOR THE RIGHT TO
THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN CAPITAL COLLATERAL
PROCEEDINGS
Because many death row inmates do not have the intellectual
capacity or skills to pursue collateral relief, meaningful access re-
quires assistance beyond Virginia's law libraries, staff attorneys, and
discretionary appointed attorneys. 122 At least one federal court has
raised concerns over the general inability of prisoners to file mean-
120 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
121 It also does not follow that Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), should
necessarily extend the Ross discretionary appeal rule to all collateral attacks. The Court
in Bounds stated:
By contrast in this case, we are concerned in large part with original actions seeking
new trials, release from confinement, or vindication of fundamental civil rights.
Rather than presenting claims that have been passed on by two courts, they fre-
quently raise heretofore unlitigated issues. As this Court has "constantly empha-
sized," habeas corpus and civil rights actions are of "fundamental importance.., in
our constitutional scheme" because they directly protect our most valued rights.
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977) (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,
485 (1969); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974)). Furthermore, the dissent in
Murray noted that capital litigation tended to continue after the appeal of right, making
meaningless any distinction between trial or appeal and collateral appeals. Murray v.
Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2778 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent stated,
"Nor can we overlook our experience that capital litigation proceeds apace after affirm-
ance of a conviction. With the vigorous opposition of state legal departments, capital
defendants seek not only review of state and federal judicial decisions, but also relief
from state governors and parole boards." Id. at 2778 n. 12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122 Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Mello, Post-Conviction
Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U.L. REv. 513, 549 (1988). The Giarratano Court
considered the complexity of habeas corpus cases, the limited time available in which to
file petitions, and the emotional strain associated with impending death.
Mello discussed the intellectual ability and skills of prisoners in general:
A 1968 study of federal and state prisons found that in most states the average
prisoner had-only eight years of education. In states with large death row popula-
tions, the figures were even more troubling: 49% of Florida inmates completed less
than nine years of education. Louisiana inmates averaged six years of schooling,
and Texas inmates had an average educational level of 5.1 years. The average in-
mate IQ in Alabama and Louisiana was eighty, while in Texas it was eighty-six.
Thirty percent of South Carolina inmates had IQs less than eighty, while 49% of
North Carolina inmates had IQs less than ninety. The study found that prisoners
are three times more likely to be mentally disabled than members of the general
population.
Mello, supra, at 549.
Mello found two additional reasons for a right to counsel on capital collateral ap-
peal. Mello, supra note 105, at 1065. First, the use of habeas corpus is a "dialectic"
between state and federal courts to delineate the boundaries of asserted rights. Id. at
1080. Both sides must have counsel to maintain the adversarial discourse. Id. Second, a
need for extreme care exists when imposing death as a punishment. Id. at 1099. These
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ingful habeas corpus and civil rights claims. 123 Poorly written but
meritorious petitions with meaningless string cites and legal phrases
could easily fall through the judicial screening process.' 24 More-
over, claims that survived the initial weeding procedure are likely to
have faltered when prisoners failed to amend complaints or other-
wise respond to the court. 125 Prisoners who did not speak English
faced an even greater barrier in gaining access.
126
Furthermore, commentators note an increasing judicial adher-
ence to "abuse of the writ" doctrines 27 and expedited procedures
for considering multiple habeas petitions. 2 8 These factors combine
with inmates' deficient legal skills, habeas law's inherent complexity,
and death row prisoners' peculiar emotional problems and time lim-
itations to leave meaningful access realistically impossible. Addi-
tionally, as the dissent acknowledged, Virginia's capital procedures
make the need for assistance of counsel more compelling because
many issues arise only in postconviction appeals. 129
two reasons in addition to the general trend of right to counsel and meaningful access
lines of authority compel the appointment of counsel. Id. at 1102.
123 Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F. Supp. 1330, 1344, 1345 (1982), rev'd, 775 F.2d 1433
(11 th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging the lower court's factual findings, the court reversed on
its reading of Bounds' meaningful access requirements), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 913 (1986).
The district court gave a few examples of particularly meaningless petitions. One bore
the title, "The Wave-Like Form of Fronds." Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1344-45. The court
also gave a representative sample of a civil rights claim:
Mr. Martin: being vocational counselor, are the essence of conspiracy. As to why Mar-
shall, are locked up anyway. Because he took inmate: Joseph Nelson, 854467, The
inmate, he is locked up for and brought from city D.O.T. to county D.O.T. After
failing to get along with his fellow inmates, on city D.O.T. Prior to January 7th,
1982, plaintiff, Marshall, had worked on county D.O.T. without any problems at all.
Mr. Martin placed Nelson, on county D.O.T. to harass and to intimidate Marshall,
because he had a civil suite against Mr. Martin's boss man, Mr. Wainwright.
Id. at 1344 n.26 (emphasis in original).
124 Id. at 1345.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1344.
127 Mello, supra note 122, at 552; see also, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (district
court must dismiss a habeas corpus petition which includes both exhausted and
unexhausted claims); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (construing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, to uphold a Florida law barring procedurally waived issues absent a showing of
cause and actual prejudice).
128 Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (application of procedural default rules in
federal capital habeas appeals); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (expedited pro-
cedures for multiple habeas petitions). Although these arguments may support the ap-
pointment of counsel on federal habeas petitions, attorneys in state collateral
proceedings would ensure that only well presented and more meritorious claims
reached the federal level.
129 Justice Stevens stated:
In contrast to the collateral process discussed in Finley, Virginia law contemplates
that some claims ordinarily heard on direct review will be relegated to postconvic-
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C. THE EFFICIENT AND JUST SOLUTION IS THE RIGHT TO THE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN CAPITAL COLLATERAL
PROCEEDINGS
Although the arbitrary line drawn between direct and collateral
appeals connotes underlying concerns over the efficient operation
and fairness of capital convictions, the Court could have avoided
such difficult choices. As to efficiency, current lengthy and repeti-
tive collateral appeal practices diminish the retributive and deter-
rent purposes of capital punishment.1 30 Both society and potential
criminals do not closely relate crimes warranting capital punishment
with the punishment given.13 1 In addition, the burgeoning number
of federal habeas petitions calls for efficient habeas procedures in
both state and federal courts.'
32
Habeas petitioners who obtain counsel, however, have a high
chance of obtaining some form of relief.133 Thus, the increase in
petitions is not pure abuse of the process. Apparently, significant
error exists in capital trials and appeals. Denying to a death row
inmate an attorney on collateral appeal is especially unjust. Too
large a chance exists that constitutional error occurred in the lower
courts and that the prisoner may receive some relief on appeal.
tion proceedings. Claims that trial or appellate counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance, for instance, usually cannot be raised until this stage....
... The postconviction procedure in Virginia may present the first opportunity
for an attorney detached from past proceedings to examine the defense and to raise
claims that were barred on direct review by prior counsel's ineffective assistance.
Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2778 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 Powell, Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1041 (1989). FormerJustice
Powell also gave an account of a typical capital trial and appeals process:
[A]fter a bifurcated trial and sentence, the defendant will appeal, first to the state
intermediate appeals court, and then to the state supreme court. The defendant
may at this point file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. If
the sentence and conviction are approved, the defendant then-often after a con-
siderable lapse of time-initiates state habeas review, appeals to the state supreme
court a second time, and again seeks certiorari. Unless relief is obtained, the next
step is to seek federal habeas review of alleged errors made by the state courts on
constitutional questions. If the federal district court denies relief, the defendant-
on the first round-usually will obtain a certificate of probable cause and request a
stay of execution from the federal court of appeals.
If relief is not obtained, a request for a stay is made to the Supreme Court,
usually accompanied by a petition for certiorari.
Id. at 1039.
131 Id. at 1041.
132 The number of federal habeas petitions has increased from 127 in 1940, to 660 in
1950, to 9542 in 1987. Id. at 1039.
133 Mello gives the success rates for state non-capital habeas petitions as ranging from
.25% to 7%. State capital habeas petitions had success rates as high as 60% for all
petitions as of 1986. Federal capital habeas petitions succeeded in 73.2% of the cases
reaching the appellate level between 1976 and 1983. Mello, supra note 122, at 520.
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Fortunately, the solution does not involve an impossible choice
between judicial efficiency and acceptable levels of injustice. In-
stead, appointing counsel to death row prisoners seeking collateral
appeal serves both goals. Counsel appointed early in the proceed-
ings helps weed out non-meritorious claims and presents coherently
those issues raising constitutional questions. 3 4 As a result, the judi-
ciary is freed from devoting valuable time to meaningless peti-
tions. 135 In addition, a more comprehensive review earlier in the
process reduces last minute questions and stays of execution.13 6 Fi-
nally, society has added assurance that a death sentence is imposed
in a constitutionally approved manner where safeguards are pro-
vided equally to prisoners.
A simple due process 3 7 analysis places this discussion within a
constitutional framework calling for judicial resolution rather than
merely leaving the matter to the legislatures. 38 The procedural due
process test of Mathews v. Eldridge weighs three factors: the private
interest at stake, the risk of violating that interest through govern-
ment action or possible substitutes, and the government's interest
in the matter. 139 According to this test, death row inmates have a
due process right to state appointed counsel on collateral appeal.
First, the prisoner in a capital case faces the possibility that the
state will unconstitutionally deprive him of his lif. Second, the
number of successful collateral attacks and a death row inmate's in-
134 See Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F. Supp. 1330, 1345 (1982), rev'd, 775 F.2d 1433
(1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 913 (1986).
135 Some may suggest that prisoners would continue filing their own pro se petitions
even if an appointed attorney categorized their claims as futile. The solution is to re-
quire the attorney to submit any claim proposed by the death row inmate. The courts
would still enjoy the efficiency of having the non-meritorious claim reduced to perhaps a
few crystal clear pages.
136 Powell, supra note 130, at 1040 ("It is only fair to add that a significant part of the
delay has been attributable to the difficulty of obtaining counsel for collateral review.").
137 The dissent states the issue as whether or not due process requires attorney ap-
pointments in this case. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2776 (1989) (Stevens,J,
dissenting). Mello also recognized an unstated due process analysis in the circuit court's
majority opinion. Mello, supra note 105, at 1072.
138 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that "[b]eyond the require-
ments of Bounds, the matter is one of legislative choice based on difficult policy consider-
ations and the allocation of scarce legal resources. Our decision today rightly leaves
these issues to resolution by Congress and the state legislatures. Murray, 109 S. Ct. at
2772 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
68, 76 (1985) (applying the Mathews due process test to appointment of a psychologist in
a capital case); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985) ("In short, when a State opts to
act in a field where its action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless
act in accord with the dictates of the Constitution-and, in particular, in accord with the
Due Process Clause."); Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (applying
due process test to civil appointment of counsel issues).
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ability to represent himself adequately indicate a high probability
that constitutional errors may slip through the system. Moreover,
appointing counsel before the pro se petition will likely substantially
affect individual cases. 140 Third, the states have no net offsetting
costs in providing death row inmates this constitutional safeguard.
The cost includes attorneys for only approximately 2000 death row
inmates in all states. 41 The benefit, however, includes a more effi-
cient collateral appeals process because fewer frivolous petitions
reach the court. Those reaching the court will more clearly state the
asserted claim.
142
Additionally, an efficient and swifter capital adjudication pro-
cess better serves both the deterrent and retributive justifications of
the death penalty. 143 Criminals may see the death penalty as a more
real possibility. 144 Society will more closely associate a crime with
its punishment. 45 Finally, the courts will have the appearance of
140 The presence of counsel substantially aids a habeas corpus petitioner in gaining
relief. One study found the presence of counsel gave a petitioner a chance of relief 15
times greater than the chance of relief given a pro se applicant. Mello, supra note 122, at
566.
141 Id. at 515. As Mello points out, the trial court did not see as significant the cost of
appointed attorneys. Virginia already appointed attorneys for those who could success-
fully file a nonfrivolous petition. Mello, supra note 105, at 1073. See Giarratano v. Mur-
ray, 668 F. Supp. 511, 515 (E.D. Va. 1986). Similarly, counsel for respondents argued
against the proposition that a right to counsel would become a right to effective counsel,
and yet another ground for further collateral attack. Brief for Respondent at 17, Murray
(No. 88-411). Instead, a United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision
based on the Giarralano trial court opinion held that the collateral petitioner had a right
to counsel, but not effective counsel. Whitley v. Muncy, 823 F.2d 55, 56 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1034 (1987). However accomplished, the courts could avoid the "flood-
gates" specter without sacrificing constitutional rights.
142 With this safeguard in place, the Court could conceivably limit further the use of
inefficient collateral appeals if it chose to do so. Similarly, these safeguards would allow
legislative solutions to habeas corpus abuses without the danger of unfavorable court
review.
143 See Powell, supra note 130, at 1041.
144 Id. FormerJustice Powell stated that "[d]elay certainly robs the penalty of much of
its deterrent value, 'since the deterrent force of penal laws is diminished to the extent
that persons contemplating criminal acitivity believe there is a possibility that they will
escape punishment through repetitive collateral attacks.'" Id. (quoting Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452-53 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion)).
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185-86 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,JJ.,
plurality opinion), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976), the plurality stated:
We may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act
in passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for
many others, the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterirent. There are
carefully contemplated murders, such as murder for hire, where the possible pen-
alty of death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act.
Id.
145 The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that
instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in pro-
moting the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe
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fairness from which they derive much of their power. Thus, due
process calls for the appointment of counsel in state death row col-
lateral appeals.
VI. CONCLUSION
The plurality's decision in Murray fails to offer to death row in-
mates a constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts as
defined in Bounds.146 Rather than giving a useful policy justification
for its holding, the plurality chose to bury its reasoning in a techni-
cal and questionable treatment of the assistance of counsel
precedent.
The plurality should have recognized the continuity in the right
to assistance of counsel and meaningful access doctrines and ex-
tended the right to include state collateral appeals. Both the due
process and equal protection clauses of the sixth and fourteenth
amendments and the inability of death row inmates to access mean-
ingfully the courts compels this result. Taking an individual's life is
too important and irreversible a state action to allow without the
procedural safeguard of state appointed attorneys for indigent
death row inmates pursuing a crucial part of the criminal adjudica-
tion process.
DONALD P. ZEITHAML, JR.
that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the
punishment they "deserve," then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help,
vigilante justice, and lynch law.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring), reh denied, 409
U.S. 902 (1972).
146 See supra note 30 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bound.
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